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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

SOLOMAN LEE FORD,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 940044-CA

Priority 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his conviction for possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a second degree felony
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(2) (b) (Supp. 1994).

This

Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f)
(Supp. 1994)•
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court properly admit a holster for a

semi-automatic handgun, a shotgun stock, and shotgun shells to
support the State's contention that defendant possessed a semiautomatic handgun and a shotgun?

A trial court has broad

discretion in deciding whether to admit evidence under rule 403,
Utah Rules of Evidence.
1994) (dicta).

State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah

Cf. State v. Branch. 743 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah

1987) ("'[w]e will not overturn the trial court's [403] ruling
• . unless the abuse of discretion is so severe that it results
in a "likelihood of injustice"'fl) (citations omitted),

cert, denied, 485 U.S. 1036 (1988); State v. Moore, 788 P.2d 525,
527 (Utah App.) (holding that this Court will not upset the trial
court's ruling "absent manifest error"), cert, denied, 800 P.2d
1105 (Utah 1990) .
2.

Has defendant overcome the presumption that his trial

counsel represented him effectively where the record contains
nothing to establish that the act defendant claims constituted
deficient performance resulted from anything other than a
prepared and reasoned tactical decision?

Defendant's claim

presents a question of law reviewed on the trial record because
defendant has presented the claim for the first time on appeal
without a prior evidentiary hearing.

State v. Ellifritz, 835

P.2d 170, 175 (Utah App. 1992).
3-

Where defendant fails to specify how the cumulative

effect of his assigned errors undermines confidence in the
outcome and fails to establish any error, may he rely on a
cumulative error argument to challenge his conviction?

Whether

the cumulative effective of individually harmless errors requires
reversal turns on whether the errors as a whole undermine
confidence in the outcome.

State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 350

(Utah App.), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Addendum A contains the text of the relevant constitutional
provisions, statutes, and rules.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with one count of aggravated
assault, a third degree felony, and one count of possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a second degree felony
because the weapon was a firearm, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§
76-5-103 (1990) and 76-10-503 (2) (b) (Supp. 1994) (R. 6-8). The
State tried defendant only on the possession of a dangerous
weapon charge,1 and the jury convicted him on that charge (R.
186, 766-67).

After the jury returned its verdict, the State

moved to dismiss the aggravated assault charge, and the trial
court granted the motion (R. 773-74).

The court sentenced

defendant to the statutory indeterminate term of one to fifteen
years (R. 248) . Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal on
January 19, 1994 (R. 251).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 19, 1993, Ms. Christine Gregg, defendant's
girlfriend, returned to her apartment after a one-week absence
(R. 587-88).

Mr. Bruce Gunnell, a friend of Ms. Gregg's,

accompanied her and sat on the couch in the living room while Ms.
Gregg went to her bedroom to get some of her things (R. 591).
Defendant, who was on parole from an armed bank robbery
conviction, walked into the apartment and into the bedroom,
cleaning what looked like a shotgun barrel and carrying three red
1

Defendant claims the trial court granted his motion to
sever, but provides no record support. Appellant's Brief at 16.
A minute entry states the trial court denied the motion (R. 71).
Nevertheless, the trial court only read the possession of a
dangerous weapon charge to the newly impaneled jury (R.559-60).
3

shotgun shells (R. 580-82, 591-92, 613-14).

When defendant

walked back out of the bedroom, he pointed a small-caliber semiautomatic chrome handgun at Mr. Gunnell, cocked it, and told Mr.
Gunnell to leave (R. 595-96).

Mr. Gunnell hurried from the

apartment, went to a nearby grocery store, and called the police
(R. 596-97).
When the police arrived at the apartment complex, they found
defendant walking away from the complex (R. 623-24) . The
officers searched defendant and the area between the complex and
the place where they stopped him (R. 627-28).

They also searched

the area around the complex and the apartment of Ms. Pahl, the
apartment next to Ms. Gregg's where defendant occasionally stayed
and had stayed for approximately two days prior to the 19th (R.
624, 628, 657). The officers never found the chrome semiautomatic handgun or the shotgun barrel (R. 628, 642-43, 649).
However, the search of the Pahl apartment produced a holster for
a semi-automatic handgun, found on top of a china cabinet, and a
red gym bag containing a shotgun stock and shotgun shells (R.
629-33, 649-50, 652-53).

According to Kody Pahl, Ms. Pahl's

fifteen year old son, defendant left things at their apartment
and brought gym bags with him (R. 662)

Although Kody could not

identify the gym bag in evidence as one of defendant's, he stated
it was not his, his younger brother's, or to his knowledge his
mother's (R. 660).
Ms. Gregg reluctantly testified at the trial (R. 669-72) .
She confirmed that defendant asked Mr. Gunnell to leave, and that
4

when he did, she saw something "silver" in his hand she thought
was a gun (R. 677-78).

She also testified about an occasion

prior to the 19th when she saw defendant carrying something
wrapped in a brown cloth that looked like a shotgun barrel,2 and
holding yellow shotgun shells (R. 676-77, 681-82, 686). Finally,
she testified that defendant carried a red gym bag, similar to
the one in evidence, from the trunk of his car to the Pahl
apartment (R. 675).
Additional facts are cited in the argument sections to which
they are relevant.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

Utah R. Evid. 403 determination.

The trial court

properly exercised its discretion to admit the holster for a
semi-automatic handgun, a shotgun stock, and shotgun shells.

The

holster, discovered during a search of the apartment where
defendant had been staying, provided circumstantial evidence to
corroborate Mr. Gunnell's and Ms. Gregg's testimony that they had
seen defendant holding a semi-automatic handgun that the police
never found.

The shotgun stock and shotgun shells supported the

State's case that defendant possessed a shotgun: Mr. Gunnell saw
only the barrel.

Moreover, the holster, stock, and shells did

not create a potential for unfair prejudice that substantially
outweighed their probative value because none of them suggests
decision on an improper basis. To the contrary, they provided
2

At first, Ms. Gregg testified she thought it was a
shotgun (R. 676-77, 681-82), but on cross-examination clarified
that she saw only the barrel (R. 686).
5

additional evidence directly probative of the central issue:
whether defendant possessed one or more firearms.
2.

Ineffective assistance of counsel.

Defendant claims

his trial counsel improperly opened the door to testimony about
his parole violations by eliciting testimony from defendant's
parole officer that defendant had no parole violations other than
violations for the conduct for which he was on trial.

The record

and defendant's argument do not demonstrate a lack of any
conceivable tactical basis for asking the question despite the
risks.

Moreover, opening the door to three unrelated parole

violations, one of which was completely discredited and the other
two of which were dissimilar to the charged crime, does not
undermine confidence in the outcome when viewed against the other
evidence that defendant possessed a firearm.
3.

Cumulative error.

Defendant claims that even if the

Court finds both his assigned errors harmless, their cumulative
effect requires reversal.

However, defendant simply states this

conclusion without providing any analysis to explain why this is
so.

Moreover, he has not established that either constitute

error.

6

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE HOLSTER FOR A
SEMI-AUTOMATIC HANDGUN, THE SHOTGUN STOCK, AND THE
SHOTGUN SHELLS TO SUPPORT THE STATE'S CHARGE THAT
DEFENDANT POSSESSED A FIREARM WHILE ON PAROLE FROM A
FELONY
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (2) (a) (Supp. 1994) prohibits a
person on parole for a felony from possessing a "dangerous
weapon."

Subsection (2)(b) makes the crime a second degree

felony when the weapon is a firearm.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-

501(2) (f) (Supp. 1994) defines firearm as "a pistol, revolver,
shotgun, sawed-off shotgun, rifle or sawed-off rifle, or any
device that could be used as a dangerous weapon from which is
expelled a projectile by any force."
Prior to trial, defendant moved to exclude the holster,
shotgun stock, and shotgun shells taken from the Pahl apartment,
basing the motion on rules 402 and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence
(R. 131-32).

The trial court denied the motion, finding the

evidence highly probative because it went to the heart of the
possession charge and that its potential for prejudice did not
"weigh heavier" than its probative value (R. 552). On appeal,
defendant claims the trial court erroneously admitted the
holster, shotgun stock, and shotgun shells, arguing primarily
that this evidence misled or confused the jury because the jury
may have believed the parts constituted a "firearm," or that the
presence of these parts equated to the actual possession of

7

"different handgun."

Appellant's Brief at 9-14.3

Defendant's

argument has not merit.
A.

Standard of review.

Traditionally, the appellate courts have reviewed a trial
court's rule 403 determination for abuse of discretion.

See,

e.g., State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1987) ("'[w]e
will not overturn the trial court's [4 03] ruling . . . unless the
abuse of discretion is so severe that it results in a "likelihood
of injustice"'") (citations omitted), cert, denied, 485 U.S. 1036
(1988); State v. Moore, 788 P.2d 525, 527 (Utah App.) (holding
that this Court will not upset the trial court's ruling "absent
manifest error"), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990).
However, the Utah Supreme Court has recently abandoned the
traditional articulation of the standards for reviewing how a
trial court applies legal principals to facts.

The supreme court

now describes these standards of review as a spectrum "consisting
of many shades of variance" where the "closeness of appellate
review of the application of law to fact actually runs the entire
length of this spectrum."

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah

1994) .

3

Defendant also argues that these items were irrelevant.
Appellant's Brief at 8-9. However, defendant does not argue that
these items had no tendency to make a fact of consequence more
probable. Utah R. Evid. 402. To the contrary, defendant merely
argues that these items had only minimal relevance, and that they
distracted the jury from the relevant issues --an argument that
addresses the trial court's rule 403 determination. The State
therefore addresses the "relevance" of the evidence in its rule 403
discussion of the evidence's probative value.

8

Defendant states that a trial court has "some" discretion in
applying the law to the facts. Appellant's Brief at 2.

To the

extent this suggests the supreme court has narrowed the trial
court's discretion in making rule 4 03 determinations, it ignores
Pena's language to the contrary.

In listing examples of points

in the spectrum, the supreme court acknowledged that rule 403
determinations fall at the end of the spectrum where the
appellate courts accord trial courts broad discretion.
Pena, 869 P.2d at 938 (dicta.)

State v.

Therefore, the trial court had

"considerable freedom" to admit or exclude the gun parts; freedom
to make that determination even though tnis Court might not agree
if it looked at the question ab initio, "in effect . . . the
freedom to be wrong without incurring reversal."
B.

Id. at 937-38.

The gun parts do not fall within the rule 403
categories requiring special scrutiny, nor
has defendant established that they should;
therefore, they are presumptively admissible.

A trial court must exclude relevant evidence where its
potential for unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its
probative value.

Utah R. Evid. 403. Generally, rule 403 creates

a presumption of admissibility.

See, e.g., State v. Dibello, 780

P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah 1989); State v. Moore, 788 p.2d 525, 526
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990).
The Utah Supreme Court has carved out three categories of
evidence that require special scrutiny: (1) gruesome photographs
of a homicide victim's body; (2) a rape victim's sexual history;
and (3) statistical evidence of matters not susceptible to
quantitative analysis.

See generally. State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d
9

at 1229 (Utah 1989).

In these categories, the presumption shifts

-- the potential for unfair prejudice presumptively outweighs its
probative value -- due to the perceived unusual propensity of
evidence in these categories to prejudice, inflame, or mislead
the jury.

Id.

Defendant suggests the trial court should have presumed the
gun parts inadmissible, but offers no argument to support this
proposition other than asserting the gun parts tended to suggest
decision on an improper basis. Appellant's Brief at 10-11.
However, that proscription applies regardless of the presumption.
Defendant offers no analysis to establish why the gun parts are
more like gruesome photographs, prior sexual history, or
questionable statistical evidence than they are like any other
piece of physical evidence presumed admissible under rule 403.
See, e.g., State v. Moore, 788 P.2d at 527 (refusing to apply the
presumptively prejudicial standard to pornographic video tapes
admitted in a prosecution for sexual exploitation of a minor).
Because the gun parts do not fall into one of the three
categories deemed presumptively inadmissible, they are
presumptively admissible.
C.

Id.

The holster, shotgun stock, and shotgun
shells were highly probative circumstantial
evidence that defendant possessed one or more
firearms.

The State predicated its case on defendant's possession of
either a small-caliber, semi-automatic handgun or a shotgun (R.
538-39) . The State offered and the court admitted the holster,
shotgun stock, and shot gun shells to support this contention (R.
10

539-45, 552-56).

Defendant claims this evidence lacked

sufficient probative value.
Defendant attacks the holster's probative value by asserting
that no evidence linked it to defendant.
12-13.

Appellant's Brief at

The record rebuts defendant's assertion.

The police

discovered the holster in the Pahl apartment, where defendant had
stayed for at least two days, where he had stayed on prior
occasions, and where he left his personal possessions (R. 628,
652-53, 657). The Pahl apartment was next to Ms. Gregg's (R.
624, 628). Therefore, the record contains evidence from which
the jury could infer the holster belonged to defendant.
Moreover, the holster provided circumstantial evidence to
support Mr. Gunnell's testimony.

Mr. Gunnell testified defendant

pointed a small-caliber, semi-automatic handgun at him when
defendant told him to leave Ms. Gregg's apartment; however, the
police could not find this weapon (R. 595-96, 628, 649). What
they did find was a holster that would fit a small-caliber, semiautomatic handgun in the Pahl apartment where defendant was
staying on the night he threatened Mr. Gunnell with a smallcaliber, semi-automatic handgun (R. 629-93, 649-53).

Therefore,

the holster was probative of the State's contention that
defendant possessed a semi-automatic weapon.

State v. McGrath,

749 P.2d 631, 634 (Utah 1988) (trial court properly admitted drug
paraphernalia and containers of suspected drugs, only a random
sample of which had been tested, to support the State's
witnesses' testimony that defendant was a supplier and that the
11

State's theory that there was an enterprise).

See also State v.

Moore, 788 P.2d at 527 (upholding the trial court's admission of
pornographic videotapes despite defendant's stipulation that the
tapes "(1) were pornographic; (2) contained material of a live
performance depicting a nude or partially nude female; (3) were
for the purpose of sexual arousal; and (4) contained material
which would be harmful to a minor").
The shotgun stock and shells supported the State's
contention that defendant also possessed a shotgun.4

Mr. Gunnel

saw defendant cleaning a shotgun barrel, but saw no stock (R.
591-92).

Ms. Gregg saw what she thought was a shotgun barrel (R.

681-82, 686) . Officer Gruber testified that the only piece of
the shotgun missing from the pieces found in the gym bag and
introduced into evidence was the barrel (R. 638-39).

The stock

supported the State's contention that defendant also possessed a
shotgun.
Similarly, the shotgun shells provided additional
circumstantial evidence that defendant possessed a shotgun.

Two

witnesses saw defendant carrying shotgun shells and the police
found the shells admitted into evidence in the gym bag with the
stock.

If defendant possessed only the shotgun barrel Mr.

Gunnell and Ms. Gregg saw, he would have no reason to keep the
shells, and especially would have no reason to keep them in the
same bag as the other gun parts. Moreover, defendant's carrying
4

Defendant does not specifically identify how the shotgun
stock and shells lacked probative value; rather, his argument
focuses on his contention that they were prejudicial.
12

the shells suggested that defendant had either just removed them
from the chamber or was about to put them in; he would have no
reason to carry around shotgun shells on two separate occasions
if he only had a barrel.
Based on the above, the holster, shotgun stock, and shotgun
shells constituted probative evidence corroborating the State's
other evidence that defendant possessed either or both a semiautomatic handgun and a shotgun.
D.

The holster, shotgun stock, and shotgun
shells did not suggest a decision on an
improper basis; to the contrary, thev went to
the heart of the issue before the jury:
whether defendant possessed a firearm.

The bulk of defendant's argument focuses on whether the
holster, shotgun stock, and shotgun shells created a potential
for unfair prejudice that substantially outweighed their
probative value.

Appellant's Brief at 9-13.

The potential for

unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value when the
evidence suggests decision on an improper basis.

State v.

Menzies, 2?r Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 28 (Utah 1994).
Defendant claims the holster, shotgun stock, and shotgun
shells misled and confused the jury by suggesting the jury could
convict defendant on the basis of those parts alone. Again, the
record rebuts this conclusion.

Defense counsel argued that the

exhibits and the barrel about which Mr. Gunnell and Ms Gregg
testified did not meet the statutory definition of a firearm (R.
752-54) . The State also conceded the shotgun stock was not a
firearm until fitted with a barrel (R. 744).
13

Counsels' argument left no room for the jury to believe the
holster, shotgun stock, and shotgun shells, by themselves,
satisfied the statutory definition of a firearm.

The jury could

only have concluded that to convict defendant of a second degree
felony, they had to find he possessed a semi-automatic pistol and
all of the components of a shotgun.

Therefore, the holster,

shotgun stock, and shotgun shells, when put into context by the
State and defense counsel, supported conviction on the
appropriate basis: that defendant possessed a firearm.
Based on the above, the trial court properly exercised its
broad discretion to admit the holster, stock, and shells.5

5

Moreover, any error in admitting this evidence does not
undermines confidence in the outcome. State v. Dibello. 780 P.2d
1221, 1229 (Utah 1989) (defendant must show that the erroneously
admitted evidence undermines confidence in the outcome).
Even
without the holster, stock, and shells, the State had the
corroborated and uncontradicted testimony that defendant cocked and
pointed a small-caliber, chrome, semi-automatic handgun at him when
defendant told him to leave Ms. Gregg's apartment (R. 595-96). Ms.
Gregg confirmed that, when defendant told Mr. Gunnell to leave, she
saw in defendant's hand something "silver" that she thought was a
handgun (R. 677-78) .
Moreover, both witnesses saw defendant
cleaning a shotgun barrel and carrying shotgun shells (R. 591-92,
613-514, 676-77, 681-82, 686). If defendant had only a barrel
rather than an entire shotgun, he would have no reason to clean the
barrel or to carry the shells with him.
Defendant called only one witness: Ms. Sharon Hawkins. Ms.
Hawkins could not rebut Mr. Gunnell's and Ms. Gregg's testimony.
Although she testified she had never seen defendant with a chrome
handgun, she admitted that she was outside of the apartment and not
looking into it when Mr. Gunnell exited (R. 723).

14

POINT II
TRIAL COUNSEL EFFECTIVELY REPRESENTED DEFENDANT BY
ELICITING TESTIMONY FROM DEFENDANT'S PAROLE OFFICER
THAT DEFENDANT HAD COMMITTED NO PAROLE VIOLATIONS PRIOR
TO THE CHARGES FOR WHICH DEFENDANT WAS ON TRIAL
The State called defendant's parole officer, Stephen Kelly,
to establish that defendant was on parole for a felony, and
therefore a "restricted person," on August 19th.

On cross-

examination, defense counsel asked Mr. Kelly whether he had any
other reported violations for defendant.

Mr. Kelly responded

that he had none (R. 582-83).
Oi redirect, the State elicited testimony about the
following reported parole violations: (1) aggravated assault for
threatening Mr. Gunnel with a silver handgun; (2) unauthorized
possession of the handgun and the shotgun; (3) aggravated assault
for threatening Ms. Gregg with a shotgun on an occasion prior tc
August 19th; (4) aggravated assault for striking Ms. Gregg; and
(5) failure to report a change of address (R. 584-85).

Defendant

objected to questions about other violations, but the trial court
allowed it because defense counsel opened the door to the inquiry
(R. 583).
On re-cross, defendant's trial counsel asked Mr. Kelly to
explain what he meant when he initially testified he had had no
problems with defendant.

Mr. Kelly responded that the

allegations he testified to on redirect only referred to the
charges for which defendant was already on trial.

(R. 586).

Defendant now claims his trial counsel represented him
ineffectively by asking a question that opened the door to
15

evidence of other conduct.

Because defendant presents this claim

for the first time on appeal without a prior evidentiary hearing,
the Court reviews the claim as a question of law.
Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah App. 1992).

State v.

However, the

Court's review of counsel's performance must be highly
deferential to avoid second-guessing counsel's performance "'on
the basis of an inanimate record.'"

State v. Callahan, 866 P.2d

590, 593 (Utah App. 1993) (citations omitted).
In order to prevail on this claim, defendant has the burden
of establishing two elements.

First, defendant must identify his

counsel's acts or omissions he claims fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and establish the acts or omissions
breached that standard.
687-88, 690 (1984).

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

However, the appellate courts must presume

trial counsel "made all significant decisions in the exercise of
reasonable professional judgment,"

Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. at 687-88, and defendant can overcome that presumption only
by showing there is a "'lack of any conceivable tactical basis'
for counsel's actions,"

State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579

(Utah App.) (citations omitted), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah
1993) .
Second, defendant must affirmatively prove that, but for the
specifically identified acts or omissions, there would exist a
"reasonable probability" of a more favorable result.
v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 694.

Strickland

A "reasonable probability" is a

probability sufficient to undermine this Court's confidence in
16

the outcome.

Id.

See also State v. Tyler.

850 P.2d 1250, 1258

(Utah 1993); State v. Frame. 723 P.2d 401, 405-406 (Utah 1986);
State v. Pursifell. 746 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah App. 1987).
Defendant has established neither element.

Defendant faults

his trial counsel's question because it opened the door to
evidence that he threatened Ms. Gregg with a shotgun, hit her,
and changed his address without reporting it to his parole
officer.

Defendant claims that had his counsel adequately

prepared, he would have realized this danger and avoided asking
Mr. Kelly about prior parole violations. Appellant's Brief at
16.6
Defendant has failed to establish that counsel's question
resulted from anything other than a prepared and reasoned
tactical choice.

Defendant's trial counsel first elicited

testimony that defendant had no other parole violations (R. 58283).

After the State elicited testimony about parole violations,

defense counsel again succeeded in eliciting testimony, albeit
incorrect, that defendant had no parole violations other than
those arising from the charges against defendant (R. 586).
Defense counsel may have believed the State would accept Mr.
Kelly's original testimony at face value.

6

Furthermore, Ms. Gregg

Defendant suggests the question negated the effective of
severing the aggravated assault charge from the possession of a
firearm charge. Appellant's Brief at 16. However, the information
charged defendant with aggravated assault from threatening Mr.
Gunnel1 with the chrome handgun (R. 6) . Because this evidence came
in anyway to support the possession charge, defense counsel did not
negate the severance the charges, even assuming the trial court
severed the charges. See footnote 1.
17

completely undermined the contention that defendant had
threatened her with a shotgun, specifically denying he had done
so or that she reported such an incident to the police (R. 68082, 694) . Defense counsel may have known in advance that Ms.
Gregg would deny the allegations, leaving only allegations that
defendant had hit Ms. Gregg and failed to report an address
change.

Defense counsel may have viewed the violation for

hitting Ms. Gregg and failing to notify about an address change
as too insignificant to outweigh the benefit of eliciting
evidence that defendant had no parole violations related to the
possession of weapons, other than those for which he was on
trial.
Conversely, the record contains no affirmative evidence
defense counsel merely overlooked the parole violations or
blundered into them.

Therefore, this record and defendant's

appellate argument fail to overcome the presumption that defense
counsel weighed the risks and benefits of asking Mr. Kelly about
other parole violations and determined to ask the question anyway
to present the jury with evidence that defendant had otherwise
complied with the conditions of his parole.

State v. Garrett,

849 P.2d at 581 (finding the record inadequate to determine
whether trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to raise a
Batson challenge to the State's peremptory challenges because the
law required this Court to presume defense counsel was acting
properly and the record had no evidence to the contrary).

18

Defendant has also failed to establish that eliciting this
testimony undermines confidence in the outcome.

First, evidence

that defendant threatened Mr. Gunnell with a handgun, and that
defendant may have possessed a shotgun would have come in anyway
to support the possession of a firearm charge.

Second, even if

evidence that defendant pointed a shotgun at Ms. Gregg, that he
hit Ms. Gregg, and that he failed to change his address, would
not have been introduced without defense counsel's question, the
outcome would have been the same.

Ms. Gregg's denial that

defendant threatened her with a shotgun eliminated any possible
prejudice from that allegation, and the other two allegations
were too dissimilar from the charges at issue to make any
difference in the outcome.

Moreover, the State introduced

consistent and uncontradicted evidence that defendant possessed a
chrome semi-automatic handgun, and introduced evidence that
defendant possessed all of the components of a shotgun.

By

contrast, defendant offered only the weak rebuttal testimony of
Ms. Hawkins, who admitted she was not looking into the apartment
when Mr. Gunnell and Ms. Gregg saw the handgun in defendant's
hand.

No reasonable likelihood exists that the jury would have

acquitted had it not heard about defendant's failure to notify
his parole officer of a change of address or that he struck Ms.
Gregg.

19

POINT III
THERE IS NO CUMULATIVE ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL
Even though errors may not individually warrant reversal,
this Court may still reverse where the errors cumulatively
undermine confidence in the outcome.

State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d

339, 350 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993).
Defendant claims that admission of the shotgun stock, shotgun
shells, and holster, coupled with defense counsel's questioning
of Mr. Kelly constitutes cumulative error.
fails for several reasons.
with any analysis.

However, this claim

First defendant fails to support it

He merely asserts that if the individual

errors do not warrant reversal, then the cumulative effect of
them does, but he provides no explanation of why this is so.
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); State v. Amicone. 689 P.2d 1341, 1344
(Utah 1984) (declining to reach the merits of the defendant's
state constitutional challenge because defendant failed to
provide any supporting legal authority or analysis).
Second, for the reasons argued above, no error exists in
this case.

Specifically, the trial court properly admitted the

physical evidence and defendant has not overcome the presumption
that his trial counsel's examination of Mr. Kelly resulted from
legitimate tactical considerations.

Because the actions about

which defendant complains do not constitute error, the Court need
not consider whether the cumulative effect of these actions
undermines confidence in the outcome.

State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d

at 350 (finding that the trial record contained numerous,
20

individually harmless errors before concluding that the
cumulative effect undermined confidence in the outcome).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / &

day of /iJfiyjyuJstt^

1994.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

THOMAS BRUNKER
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE was mailed by first-class mail,
postage pre-paid, to the following on this 7

day of *^rt/gt-<<^^S

1994
L. Clark Donaldson
321 North 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON

76-5-103

76-5-102.5. Assault by prisoner.
Any prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause bodily injury, is
guilty of a felony of the third degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-102.5, enacted by L.
1974, ch. 32, § 33.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Assault against peace officer.
Evidence of assault.
—Sufficient.
Assault against peace officer.
This section and § 76-5-102.4 do not proscribe identical conduct when the assault is
against a peace officer. The statutes apply to
different classes of persons, the former applying to "any person" and the latter applying to
"any prisoner." State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982
m*ih r+ An« lofted
luian L,t. App. ISB»;.
Evidence of assault.
Where, as part of standard jail procedure,

the videotape of all bookings, including the defendant's, was erased and recycled after 72
hours if there was no request to retain it, and
th e defendant sought dismissal of the charge
th a t s n e > w hii e in custody, had assaulted a pol i c e officer
> because there was no showing that
loss of t h e
**!* destroyed evidence vital to the
issue
the
°t
defendant's guilt, the trial court
erre(
* in dismissing the assault charge. State v.
Jiminez, 761 P.2d 577 (Utah ( X App. 1988).
Cuffi^'ow*
"?
J * • r *i
• *•
• **
Jurv
verdict, implicitly rejecting statutory
defenses of self-defense and defense of habitation, was supported by the evidence. State v.
Duran, 772 P.2d 982 (Ct. App. 1989).

76-5-103. Aggravated assault.
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined
in Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) Aggravated assault is a third degree felony.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-103, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-103; 1974, ch. 32, § 10;
1989, ch. 170, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, substituted
"dangerous weapon as defined in Section

76-1-601" for "deadly weapon" in Subsection
(l)(b) and made stylistic changes throughout
the section.
Cross-References. — Attempt, § 76-4-101.
Possession of a dangerous weapon with intent to assault, § 76-10-507.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Dangerous weapon.
Defense of habitation.
Evidence.
—Sufficient.
Indictment or information.
Instructions.
—Flight.
Jury question.
Lesser included offense.
Mental element,
Object of threat.

—Victim.

Recklessness.
Self-defense.
Serious bodily injury.
Threatening with dangerous weapon distinguished.
Voluntary intoxication.
Cited
Dangerous weapon.
Under former statute which described assault with deadly weapon, character of weapon
could be inferred from wounds or other indicia,
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History: C. 1953,76-10-307, enacted by L. sive, chemical, or incendiary device, knowing it
1973, ch. 196, S 76-10-307; 1993, ch. 75, ( 2 . to be the device" for "infernal machine, knowing
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend- it to be such" and made stylistic changes,
ment, effective May 3,1993, substituted 'explo-

76-10-808. Explosive, chemical, or incendiary device —
Venue of prosecution for shipping.
Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly.delivers any explosive, chemical, or incendiary device to any person for transmission without the
consent or direction of the lawful possessor may be prosecuted in the county in
which he delivers it or in the county to which it is transmitted.
H i s t o r i c . 1953,76-10-308, enacted by L. enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 196, § 76-10-308,
1993, ch. 75, i 3.
making construction or possession of an inferRepeals and Reenactments. — Laws nal machine a third-degree felony, and enacts
1993, ch. 75, ( 3 repeals former § 76-10-308, as the present section, effective May 3,1993.

76-10-309. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1993, ch. 75, ( 4 repeals
{ 76-10-309, as enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 196,
5 76-10-309, specifying the venue of prosecu-

tion for shipping an infernal machine, effective
May 3, 1993. For present comparable provisions, see § 76-10-308.

PART 4
FENCES
76-10-401. Fencing of shafts and wells.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AXJL — Validity of statutes requiring the
construction of fences — modern cases, 87
ALJUth 1129.

PART 5
WEAPONS
76-10-501. Uniform law — Definitions.
(1) (a) The individual right to keep and bear arms being a constitutionally
protected right, the Legislature finds the need to provide uniform laws
throughout the state.
(b) This part is uniformly applicable throughout this state and in all its
political subdivisions and municipalities. A local authority may not enforce
any rule in conflict with this part and there is a moratorium prohibiting
local authorities from enacting or enforcing any new ordinance, regulation, or rule pertaining tofirearmsuntil May 1, 1995, unless hereafter
authorized by the Legislature by statute.
(2) As used in this part:
(a) "Crime of violence* means aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, rape, mayhem, kidnapping, robbery, burglary, housebreaking, extor136
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tion, or blackmail accompanied by threats of violence, assault with a
dangerous weapon, assault with intent to commit any offense punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year, arson punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, or an attempt to commit any of these
offenses.
(b) "Criminal history background check" means a criminal background
check conducted by a licensed firearms dealer on every purchaser of a
handgun through the division or the local law enforcement agency where
thefirearmsdealer conducts business.
(c) "Dangerous weapon" means any item that in the manner of its use or
intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. The
following factors shall be used in determining whether an item, object, or
thing not commonly known as a dangerous weapon is a dangerous weapon:
(i) the character of the instrument, object, or thing;
(ii) the character of the wound produced, if any; and
(iii) the manner in which the instrument, object, or thing was used.
(d) "Dealer" means every person who is licensed under crimes and
criminal procedure, 18 U.S.C. 923 and engaged in the business of selling,
leasing, or otherwise transferring a handgun, whether the person is a
retail or wholesale dealer, pawnbroker, or otherwise.
(e) "Division" means the Law Enforcement and Technical Services
Division of the Department of Public Safety, created in Section 53-5-103.
(f) "Firearm" means a pistol, revolver, shotgun, sawed-off shotgun, rifle
or sawed-off rifle, or any device that could be used as a dangerous weapon
from which is expelled a projectile by any force.
(g) "Firearms transaction record form" means a form created by the
division to be completed by a person purchasing, selling, or transferring a
handgunfroma dealer in the state.
(h) "Handgun" means afirearmwhich has a short stock and is designed
to be held andfiredby the use of a single hand.
(i) "Prohibited area" means any place where it is unlawful to discharge
a firearm.
(j) "Sawed-off shotgun" or "sawed-offrifle"means a shotgun having a
barrel or barrels of fewer than 18 inches in length, or in the case of a rifle,
having a barrel or barrels of fewer than 16 inches in length, or any
dangerous weapon madefroma rifle or shotgun by alteration, modification, or otherwise, if the weapon as modified has an overall length of fewer
than 26 inches.
History: C. 1953,76-10-501, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, S 76-10-501; 1974, ch. 32, § 27;
1985, ch. 35,6 1; 1991, ch. 10, ft 11; 1993, ch.
234, S 881; 1994, ch. 19, ( 1; 1994, ch. 151,
§ 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, rearranged the
definitions in Subsection (2) so as to place them
in alphabetical order and in Subsection (2Xb)
substituted "aggravated murder, murder, man•laughter" for "murder, voluntary manslaughter."
The 1993 amendment, effective July 1,1993,
deleted former Subsection (2Xa), defining "Bureau"; redesignated former Subsections (2Xb)

and (c) as present Subsections (2Xa) and (b);
added designations (bXi), (b)(ii), and (bXiii) to
Subsection (2); added present Subsection (2Xc);
rewrote Subsection (2)(d); substituted "firearm*
for "weapon* in Subsection (2Xe); inserted "or
'sawed-off rifle'"and "dangerous*in Subsection
(2Xf); and made stylistic changes throughout
the section.
The 1994 amendment by ch. 19, effective
February 28, 1994, added Subsections (2Kb),
(d), (g), and (h), renumbering the remaining
subsections accordingly.
The 1994 amendment by ch. 151, effective
March 17,1994, substituted "enforce" for "enact
or enforce" in the second sentence in Subsection
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(lXb) and added the second clause in that
sentence, imposing a moratorium on local regulation of
firearms.
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Weapons Task Force. — Laws 1994, ch.
151, J§ 2 to 7 create the Weapons Task Force,

to consist of legislators and citizens representing various specified interests, to study "which
weapons laws should be under local control or
state control; and any conflicts in state, local,
and federal weapons laws." The task force is to
report to the Judiciary Interim Committee by
December 1994 and is repealed December 31,
1994.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
. . ,.
Constitutionality.
•Dangerous weapon."
Constitutionality.
This section provided defendant adequate
notice that his knives and blowgun were "dangerous weapons," and was therefore not unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. State v.

Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah Ct. App.
1^91).
-Dangerous weapon,"
Defendant's two 10-inch knives with 5- and
6-inch blades and his 48-inch blowgun were
"dangerous weapons" within the meaning of the
statute. State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.T..R. — Fact that gun was broken, dismantied, or inoperable as affecting criminal respon-

sibility under weapons statute, 81 A.L.R.4th
745.

76-10-502. When weapon deemed loaded.
(1) For the purpose of this chapter, any pistol, revolver, shotgun, rifle, or
other weapon described in this part shall be deemed to be loaded when there
is an unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile in the firing position.
(2) Pistols and revolvers shall also be deemed to be loaded when an
unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile is in a position whereby the manual
operation of any mech--*-:n once would cause the unexpended cartridge, shell,
or projectile to be fire:
(3) A muzzle loading n;turm shall be deemed to be loaded when it is capped
or primed and has a powder charge and ball or shot in the barrel or cylinders.
History: C. 1953, 79-100-502, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, i 76-10-502; 1974, ch. 32,
I 28; 1990, ch. 828, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-

ment, effective April 23, 1990, inserted the
subsection designations (1) to (3); substituted
"chapter" for "section" in Subsection (1); and
made stylistic changes throughout.

76-10-503. Purchase or possession of dangerous weapon/
handgun — Persons not permitted to have —
Penalties.
(1) (a) Any person who has been convicted of any crime of violence under
the laws of the United States, this state, or any other state, government,
or country, or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or who has
been declared mentally incompetent may not own or have in his possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in
this part.
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(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm or sawed-off
shotgun, he is guilty of a third degree felony.
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole or probation for a felony may not have
in his possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as
defined in this part.
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a third degree
felony but if the dangerous weapon is afirearm,explosive, or incendiary
device he is guilty of a second degree felony.
(3) (a) A person may not purchase, possess, or transfer any handgun
described in this part who:
(i) has been convicted of any felony offense under the laws of the
United States, this state, or any other state;
(ii) is under indictment;
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in
Section 58-37-2;
(iv) is a drug dependent person as defined in Section 58-37-2;
(v) has been adjudicated as mentally defective, as provided in the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107
Stat. 1536 (1993), or has been committed to a mental institution;
(vi) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States;
(vii) has been dischargedfromthe Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions; or
(viii) is a person who, having been a citizen of the United States,
has renounced such citizenship,
(b) Any person who violates Subsection (3) is guilty of a third degree
felony.
History: C. 1953,76-10-503, enacted by L.
P73, ch. 196, § 76-10-503; 1977, ch. 82, S 1;
986, ch. 210, S 1; 1990, ch. 160, § 1; 1991,
b.17,8 1; 1991, ch. 87,1 5; 1993, ch. 62, § 2;
B94, ch. 19, § 2; 1994, ch. 149,ft 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendlent, effective April 23, 1990, deleted "or a
iwfully admitted alien who has obtained a
pedal hunting permitfromthe Department of
ublic Safety" before "or any person" in the first
antence in Subsection (lXa), inserted "or probation" and substituted "in a correctional facily" for "at the Utah state prison or other like
icility" in Subsection (2Xa), substituted "but"
>r "and" in Subsection (2Xb), and made minor
tylistic changes.
The 1991 amendments, both effective April
9,1991, made identical changes: in Subsection
LXa), deleted "who is not either a citizen of the
Jnited States or a lawfully admitted alien
?hose business, occupation, or duties require
he use of a dangerous weapon; or any person*
allowing "person" and deleted the former sec-

ond sentence, which read "The Department of
Public Safety shall adopt rules governing the
issuance and use of special hunting permits for
lawfully admitted aliens."
The 1993 amendment, effective May 3,1993,
deleted "or is incarcerated in a correctional
facility" after "felony" in Subsection (2Xa).
The 1994 amendment by ch. 19, effective
February 28, 1994, added Subsection (3).
The 1994 amendment by ch. 149, effective
May 2, 1994, substituted "this state" for "the
state" in Subsection (lXa), "this subsection" for
"this section" in Subsections (1Kb) and (2Xb),
and "incendiary device" for "infernal machine"
in Subsection (2Xb).
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Federal Law. — The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, cited in Subsection
(3XaXv), is codified mainly as 18 U.S.C. § 921
et seq.
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n, because jurisdiction attached under the
tute in effect when the petition for review
s filed. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n
Board of State Lands, 869 R2d 909 (Utah
•3).
formal adjudicative proceedings,
ubdivision (3Xe)(iii) confers jurisdiction in
Supreme Court only overfinalorders and
wi that originate in formal judicative
eedings m agency actions. Southern Utah
erness Alliance v. Board of State Lands &
stry, 830 P.2d 233 (Utah 1992).

Certiorari.
When exercising certiorari jurisdiction
granted by this section, the Supreme Court
reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals,
not of the trial court; therefore, the briefs of the
P?* i e 8 ^ould address the decision of the Court
°f ^ ^ f t
^ ^ I ^ J ^ T ^ ^
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 R2d 97 (Utah 1992).
C i t e d fa g U t o v Humphrey, 823 R2d 464
njtah 1991)

CHAPTER 2a
COURT OF APPEALS
3.

Court of Appeals jurisdiction.

a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
The Court ofAppeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and
le all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
Fhe Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
cutory appeals, over:
[a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative
>ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
brmal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public
•vice Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board
)il, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
i) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of
the state or other local agencies, and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
) appeals from the juvenile courts;
) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims
irtment of a circuit court;
interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
rt those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those
ring a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
ns who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence,
t petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence
first degree or capital felony;
appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chalg the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases
ing a first degree or capital felony;
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(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
0') appealsfromthe Utah Military Court; and
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appealsfromthe Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L.
J986, ch. 47, S 46; 1987, ch. 161, S 804; 1988,
jch. 73, S 1; 1988, ch. 210, 5 141; 1988, ch.
248, S 8; 1990, ch. 80,5 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3;
1991, ch. 268, § 22; 1992, ch. 127, § 12; 1994,
ch. 13, S 45.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subsec-

tion (2Xh) and redesignated former Subsections
(2)(h) through (j) as Subsections (2Xi) through
(k).
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994,
substituted "Board of Pardons and Parole" for
"Board of Pardons" in Subsection (2Xh) and
inserted "Administrative Procedures Act" in
Subsection (4).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
viction or sentence is challenged. Padilla v.
Utah Bd. of Pardons, 820 P.2d 473 (Utah 1991).

ANALYSIS

Habeas corpus proceedings.
Scope.
Cited.

Scope.
This statute does not authorize the Court of
Appeals to review the orders of every administrative agency, but allows judicial review of
agency decisions "when the legislature expressly authorizes a right of review." Barney v.
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, 828 P.2d 542 (Utah Ct. App.), cert
denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992).

Habeas corpus proceedings.
Appeal from the dismissal of a habeas corpus
petition, in which defendant claimed only that
his due process rights were violated at a hearing before the parole board, lay to the Court of
Appeals rather than the Supreme Court; the
latter has jurisdiction only over direct appeals
of first degree or capital felony convictions and
appeals in habeas corpus cases where the con-

Cited in State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464
(Utah 1991).

CHAPTER 3
DISTRICT COURTS
Section
78-3-4.

78-3-11.5.

Section
78-3-16.5.
78-3-21.

Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases
to circuit court — Appeals —
Jurisdiction when circuit and
district court merged.
State District Court Administrative System.

78-3-21.5.

7

Repealed.
Judicial Council — Creation —
Members — Terms and election — Responsibilities — Reports.
Data bases for judicial boards.

Rule 2 4
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same standards as the review of findings of fact in other appeals.
(Added effective October 1, 1992.)
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Allegation of facts required.
Because defendant did not allege any facts in
support of his inefifective assistance claim, the
appellate court would not remand the case for
an evidentiary hearing. It would be improper

to remand a claim under this rule for a fishing
expedition. State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 860 P. 943 (Utah
1993).

Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under
appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or
agency whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where
the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties.
The list should be set out on a separate page which appears immediately
inside the cover.
(2) A table of contents, with page references.
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited.
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisciicuon of the appellate court.
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review and the standard of
appellate review with supporting authority for each issue.
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative shall be set out verbatim with
the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy,
the citation alone will suffice, and in that event, the provision shall be set
forth as provided in paragraph (f) of this rule.
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly
the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the
court below A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for
review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with
paragraph (e) of this rule.
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of trie arguments actually
made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the
heading under which the argument is arranged.
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, with citations
to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that a statement of the
issues or of the case need not be made unless the appellee is dissatisfied with
the statement of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief
in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the crossappeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in
the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (6), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs
may be filed except with leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their
briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such
designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the
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actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as 'the employee," "the
iiyured person," 'the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the
pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b), to pages of
the reporter's transcript, or to pages of any statement of the evidence or
proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g).
References to exhibits shall include exhibit numbers. If reference is made to
evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made
to the pages of the transcript at which the evidence was identified, offered,
and received or rejected.
(f) Reproduction of statutes, rules, regulations, documents, etc. If determination of the issues presented requires the study of statutes, rules, regulations, etc., or relevant parts thereof, to the extent not set forth under subparagraph (a)(6) of this rule, they shall be reproduced in the brief or in an
addendum at the end, or they may be supplied to the court in pamphlet form.
Copies of those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to
the determination of the appeal (e.g., the challenged instructions, findings of
fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the contract or document
subject, to construction, etc.) shall also be included in the addendum.
(g) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs
shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive
of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (f) of this rule.
(h) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the
party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the
purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the
court otherwise orders. The brief of the appellee shall contain the issues and
arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of
the appellant.
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated
for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and
any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of
another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original
letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing
and shall be similarly limited.
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and
free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs
which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer.
(1) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy cover stock and
shall comply with Rule 27.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Advisory Committee Note. — The brief
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendmust now contain for each issue raised on ap- ment, effective October 1, 1992, added the
peal, a statement of the applicable standard of third sentence in Subdivision (c) and made styreview and citation of supporting authority. listic changes in Subdivisions (a)(5) and (7).
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Rule 402

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evidence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 78.
United States v. Downing: Novel Scientific
Evidence and the Rejection of Frye, 1986 Utah
L. Rev. 839.
A.L.R. — Admissibility of evidence of ab-

sence of other accidents or injuries at place
where injury or damage occurred, 10 A.L.R.5th
371.
Admissibility of evidence in homicide case
that victim was threatened by one other than
defendant, 11 A.L.R.5th 831.

Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah,
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
Advisory Committee Note. — The text of
this rule is Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974) except that prior to the word
"statute" the words "Constitution of the United
States" have been added.

Compiler's Notes. — The Utah rule also
adds the words "or the Constitution of the state
of Utah" to Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Discretion of court.
Effect of remoteness.
Irrelevant evidence.
Probability evidence.
Scientific evidence.
Standard of review.
Cited.
Discretion of court
The trial court is given considerable discretion in deciding whether or not evidence submitted is relevant. Bambrough v. Bethers, 552
P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976).
While relevant evidence is generally admissible, a trial court has broad discretion to determine whether proffered evidence is relevant, and the appellate court will find error in
a relevancy ruling only if the trial court has
abused its discretion. State v. Harrison, 805
P.2d 769 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d
327 (Utah 1991).
Effect of remoteness.
Remoteness usually goes to the weight of the
evidence and not its admissibility. Terry v.
Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314
(Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds,
McFarland v. Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678 P.2d 298
(Utah 1984).
Irrelevant evidence.
Testimony as to impulsiveness of another
participant in the crime had no bearing on defendant's guilt or innocence and was properly

excluded as not relevant to defendant's partici-.
pation in the crime. State v. Stephens, 667
P.2d 586 (Utah 1983).
Probability evidence.
Courts have routinely excluded probability
evidence when the evidence invites the jury to
focus upon a seemingly scientific, numerical
conclusion rather than to analyze the evidence
before it and decide where truth lies. State v.
Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986).
Scientific evidence.
The Frye test (that scientific tests still in the
experimental stages should not be admitted in
evidence, but that scientific testimony deduced
from a well recognized scientific principle or
discovery is admissible if the scientific principle is sufficiently established) is a valid test,
though not necessarily an exclusive test, for
determining when scientific evidence is sufficiently reliable to be admitted and is not inconsistent with Rules 402, 403, and 702 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence. Kofford v. Flora, 744
P.2d 1343 (Utah 1987).
Standard of review.
The judgment of the trial court admitting or
excluding evidence will not be reversed unless
it is shown that the discretion exercised
therein has been abused. Terry v. Zions Coop.
Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979),
overruled on other grounds, McFarland v.
Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984).
Cited in State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — United States v.
Downing: Novel Scientific Evidence and the
Rejection of Frye, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 839.
Note, Establishing Paternity Through HLA
Testing: Utah Standards for Admissibility,
1988 Utah L. Rev. 717.
The Mysterious Creation of Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rules Under State Constitutions: The Utah Example, 1993 Utah L. Rev.
751.

A.L.R. — Admissibility of voice stress evaluation test results or of statements made during
test, 47 A.L.R.4th 1202.
Admissibility and weight of evidence of prior
misidentification of accused in connection with
commission of crime similar to that presently
charged, 50 A.L.R.4th 1049.
Products liability: admissibility of evidence
of absence of other accidents, 51 A.L.R.4th
1186.

Rule 403
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Thermographic tests: admissibility of test results in personal injury suits, 56 A.L.R.4th
1105.
Criminal law: dog scent discrimination
lineups, 63 A.L.R.4th 143.
Products liability: admissibility of experimental or test evidence to disprove defect in
motor vehicle, 64 A.L.R.4th 125.
Admissibility, in criminal cases, of evidence

492

of electrophoresis of dried evidentiary bloodstains, 66 A.L.R.4th 588.
Admissibility, in prosecution for sex-related
offense, of results of tests o.a semen or seminal
fluids, 75 A.L.R.4th 897.
Admissibility of hypnotically refreshed or
enhanced testimony, 77 A.L.R.4th 927.
Admissibility of DNA identification evidence, 84 A.L.R.4th 313.

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively
comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971) except that "surprise" is not included as
a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence. The
change in language is not one of substance,
since "surprise" would be within the concept of
"unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 402
[Rule 403]. See also Advisory Committee Note
to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a continuance in most instances would be a more appropriate method of dealing with "surprise."
See also Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647
(N.D. Tex. 1977) (surprise use of psychiatric

testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial and
violation of due process). See the following
Utah cases to the same effect. Terry v. Zions
Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah
1979); State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260 (Utah
1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah
1982).
Compiler's Notes. — The bracketed reference to "Rule 403" in the Advisory Committee
Note to Rule 403 was inserted because Rule
402 does not refer to "unfair prejudice" and
Rule 403 appears to be the correct reference.
Cross-References. — Admissibility of evidence, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Balancing test.
Bias.
Circumstantial evidence.
Credibility of witness.
Cumulative evidence.
Determination of admissibility.
Expert testimony.
Film of murder scene.
Guilty plea.
Harmless error.
Impeachment of witness.
Inflammatory evidence.
Offensive remarks.
Other offenses.
Photographic evidence.
Prior convictions.
—Impeachment.
Psychiatric history and drug abuse.
Scientific evidence.
Standard of review.
Tape recordings.
—Defendant's admissions.
—Videotapes in pornography trial.
Unfairly prejudicial.
Victim's testimony.
Cited.
Balancing test.
The balancing test of this rule excludes matter of scant or cumulative probative force,
dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect. State v. Bartley, 784 P.2d 1231
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).

Bias.
The right to cross-examine regarding bias is
limited by this rule. State v. Hackford, 737
P.2d 200 (Utah 1987).
Circumstantial evidence.
Circumstantial evidence, although relevant,
may nevertheless be excluded if the usefulness
of the evidence is more than counterbalanced
by its disadvantageous effects in confusing the
issues before the jury, or in creating an undue
prejudice in excess of its legitimate probative
weight. Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst.,
605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), overruled on other
grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678
P.2d 298 (Utah 1984).
Credibility of witness.
This rule is not to be used to allow the trial
judge to substitute his assessment of the credibility of testimony for that of the jury by excluding testimony simply because he does not
find it credible. State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187
(Utah 1987), cert, denied, 485 U.S. 1036,108 S.
Ct. 1597, 99 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1988).
Cumulative evidence.
While there may have been little reason to
admit into evidence transcripts of recorded
conversations between the defendant and a
government informant because the evidence
was cumulative, their admission was not prejudicial because the transcripts merely repeated
the informant's in-court testimony. State v.
Knowles, 709 P.2d 311 (Utah 1985).
Determination of admissibility.
Although the relevancy of proffered evidence

